

The Honorable Ricardo S. Martinez

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Petitioner,

v.

MICROSOFT CORPORATION, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV 2:15-0102RSM

BRIEF OF *AMICI CURIAE* SOFTWARE
FINANCE AND TAX EXECUTIVES
COUNCIL, NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE
COUNCIL, FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES
INTERNATIONAL, INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY COUNCIL,
AND NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MANUFACTURERS REGARDING
PRIVILEGED DOCUMENTS

NOTED FOR: NOVEMBER 11, 2016

BRIEF OF *AMICI CURIAE*

Case No. 2:15-0102RSM

MICHELLE PETERSON LAW, PLLC
1420 FIFTH AVENUE, SUITE 2200
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101
206.224.7618

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1 For ease of reference, SoFTEC, NFTC, FEI, ITI, and NAM are collectively referred to
2 as “Amici” in this brief. Amici members believe that their written communications with non-
3 attorney outside tax advisors should be protected by the tax practitioner privilege of Internal
4 Revenue Code Section 7525 (the “Tax Privilege”). Amici members are concerned because
5 the U.S. Government challenges whether written communications with their non-attorney tax
6 advisors are private and confidential. The Government’s position would reduce the ability of
7 Amici members to have frank discussions with their non-attorney tax advisors, and would
8 jeopardize their ability to explore tax issues without fear of those conversations being open to
9 discovery by the Government, as well as third parties. If the Court sustains the Government’s
10 position that cost sharing agreements and other methods of structuring overseas operations by
11 multinational companies are “tax shelters” and the routine tax advice they receive from their
12 non-attorney tax advisors is prohibited “promotion,” then Amici members will need to
13 reconsider whether they use non-attorney tax advisors for their routine tax advice.
14
15

16 **SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT**

17 This case involves the protection of confidential communications between taxpayers
18 and their non-attorney tax advisors. The Tax Privilege is codified in Section 7525(a), and is
19 essentially coterminous with the common law attorney-client privilege. *See Schaeffler v.*
20 *United States*, 806 F.3d 34, 38 n.3 (2d Cir. 2015). Section 7525(b), however, provides that
21 the Tax Privilege does not apply to otherwise confidential written communications between a
22 taxpayer and a tax advisor that are “in connection with the promotion of the direct or indirect
23 participation of the person in any tax shelter.” The term “tax shelter” has an extremely broad
24 definition and encompasses any transaction in which “a significant purpose” is the avoidance
25 of tax. The term “promotion” in Section 7525(b)(2), however, is not defined.
26

1 In this case, the Government offers an interpretation of “promotion” that is so broad
2 and overreaching that, if accepted, it would remove routine tax advice and common tax
3 planning from the protections of the Tax Privilege. This overly broad interpretation is
4 contrary to Congress’s intent that the privilege be co-terminus with the attorney-client
5 privilege and the sound tax policy favoring the free flow of information between taxpayers
6 and their advisors. Accordingly, the Government’s interpretation should not be adopted.
7

8 Section 7525(a) states that the same common law protections of confidentiality under
9 the attorney-client privilege are also available under the Tax Privilege. The intent of
10 Congress in enacting the Tax Privilege was to allow taxpayers to consult with non-lawyer tax
11 advisors in the same manner they consult with tax advisors who are licensed to practice law.
12 As such, the principles of the Tax Privilege mirror the common law attorney-client privilege:
13 “to encourage full and frank communication between advisors and their clients and thereby
14 promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.”
15 *Upjohn Co. v. United States*, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). Microsoft decided to set up a cost-
16 sharing arrangement in the Americas region with its Puerto Rican operations, and engaged
17 KPMG to advise it. *See* Declaration of Michael P. Boyle at p. 8. This is precisely the kind of
18 typical and routine tax planning for which Amici members engage non-attorney tax advisors.
19

20 Case law provides ample support for the position that a non-attorney tax advisor must
21 do more than simply offer routine tax advice in order to be considered a “promoter” of a “tax
22 shelter.” In *Countryside Ltd. P’ship v. Comm’r*, 132 T.C. 347 (2009), the Tax Court held that
23 routine tax advice given as part of an ongoing client-advisor relationship is not “promotion”
24 within the meaning of Section 7525(b). Several cases following *Countryside* have held
25 similarly, focusing on whether the non-attorney tax advisor has a financial interest in the
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advice given other than what he bills at his typical hourly rate. *See, e.g., Rawls Trading, L.P. v. Comm’r*, T.C. Memo. 2012-340; *106 Ltd. v. Comm’r*, 136 T.C. 67 (2011), *aff’d*, 684 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2012); *Tigers Eye Trading, LLC v. Comm’r*, T.C. Memo. 2009-121.

The Government seeks to vitiate Section 7525 protection, relying solely on *Valero Energy Corp. v. United States*, No. 06 C 6730, 2008 WL 4104368 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 26, 2008), *aff’d*, 569 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2009), as support for its strained interpretation of “promotion.” This reliance is misguided, as *Valero* did not place sufficient limits on the scope of the Section 7525(b) exception. *Valero* read promotion to mean “furtherance or encouragement,” which, when coupled with a broad definition of “tax shelter,” ensures that routine tax advice offered by non-attorney tax advisors will no longer be privileged. The Government’s approach would result in the exception “swallowing the rule,” which will impair the ability of tax advisors to assist their clients in complying with an exceedingly complex area of law.

ARGUMENT

I. A Narrow Interpretation of “Promotion” Furthers Both the Principles of the Tax Privilege and Congress’s Intent in Enacting the Tax Privilege.

The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law. *See Upjohn*, 449 U.S. at 389; *United States v. Bauer*, 132 F.3d 504, 510 (9th Cir. 1997). Courts regularly emphasize that the preservation of the attorney-client privilege is “essential to the just and orderly operation of our legal system.” *Id.* at 510. *See also Klein v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co.*, 806 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1128 (S.D. Cal. 2011); *North Dakota v. United States*, 64 F. Supp. 3d 1314, 1330 (D.N.D. 2014).

The Tax Privilege is no less important. Section 7525(a) plainly states that:

With respect to tax advice, the same common law protections of confidentiality which apply to a communication between a taxpayer and an attorney shall also

1 apply to a communication between a taxpayer and any federally authorized tax
2 practitioner to the extent the communication would be considered a privileged
communication if it were between a taxpayer and an attorney.

3 Moreover, legislative history, H.R. Rep. No. 105-599, at 268 (1998), makes clear Congress's
4 intent that the attorney-client privilege and the Tax Privilege be essentially coterminous:

5 The provision allows taxpayers to consult with other qualified tax advisors in the
6 same manner they currently may consult with tax advisors that are licensed to
7 practice law. The provision does not modify the attorney-client privilege of
confidentiality, other than to extend it to other authorized practitioners.

8 Indeed, sound public policy favors taxpayers being well advised with respect to their
9 tax affairs. The more that can be done at the planning stage to ensure that taxpayers comply
10 with the law, the fewer tax controversies will arise that needlessly expend public and private
11 resources. The Tax Privilege furthers this public policy. Section 7525(b)(2) excepts from
12 protection communications made "in connection with the promotion of the direct or indirect
13 participation of the person in any tax shelter (as defined in section 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii))." "Tax
14 shelter" is defined very broadly as any entity, plan or arrangement a significant purpose of
15 which is the avoidance or evasion of federal income tax. The scope of what constitutes a "tax
16 shelter" hinges on the meaning of "a significant purpose." This meaning is ambiguous, and
17 could cover a broad range of transactions.
18
19

20 In view of the broad definition of "tax shelter," a narrower interpretation of
21 "promotion" is necessary to preserve the intended benefits of the Tax Privilege. The
22 legislative history supports this construction and indicates that the exception was intended to
23 target only the promotion of abusive transactions and not routine tax planning. As originally
24 reported, the law excepted only criminal tax matters from the scope of the Tax Privilege. In
25 conference, the committee unexpectedly added a blanket exception to the Tax Privilege for
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1 “communications relating to corporate tax shelters.” Sheryl Stratton, *Accountants’ Tax*
2 *Shelter Work Not Privileged Under New Privilege*, Tax Notes, June 29, 1998, p. 1666.
3 Ultimately, a compromise was reached and the exception was narrowed to cover only
4 communications relating to the “promotion” of corporate tax shelters. *Id.* The conference
5 report, H.R. Rep.105-599, at 269, confirms the limited scope of the compromise exception:

6 The Conferees do not understand the promotion of tax shelters to be part of the
7 routine relationship between a tax practitioner and a client. Accordingly, the
8 Conferees do not anticipate that the tax shelter limitation will adversely affect such
9 routine relationships.

10 Use of the broad definition of “tax shelter” without the “promotion” limitation would
11 have rendered the new Tax Privilege, intended to be coterminous with the attorney-client
12 privilege, a near nullity. Most taxpayers seek tax advice to reduce their taxes. Consider the
13 case of a homeowner who seeks the advice of a tax accountant with respect to the deduction
14 for home mortgage interest. Such advice would have “tax avoidance” as a “significant
15 purpose” such that, but for the “promotion” limitation, the Tax Privilege would not apply.

16 Congressional leaders foresaw problems with the conference committee’s efforts to
17 clarify the provision. Members of the Senate Committee on Finance, including its ranking
18 member, raised concerns over potential government attempts to interpret the tax shelter
19 exception broadly. For example, Senator Connie Mack (R-FL) examined the issue:

20
21 I am concerned, though, about an amendment to this provision that was inserted at
22 the 11th hour while the bill was in conference. The amendment was meant to target
23 written promotional and solicitation materials used by the peddlers of corporate tax
24 shelters, but appears to me to be vague and unfortunately employs an ambiguous
25 definition of tax shelter that some argue could be read to include all tax planning. I
26 discussed the problems inherent in this last-minute attempt to create an exception
for the marketing of corporate tax shelters in meetings and discussion with the
Majority Leader, Chairman Roth, their counterparts in the House, and the Speaker.
It was agreed that the language would be clarified to alleviate these concerns and
ensure that the amendment does not cover routine tax advice and normal tax

1 planning designed to minimize a corporation's federal tax liability. The language of
 2 the conference report, however, could be interpreted in a manner which does not
 3 fully reflect our understanding and thus undermines the intended benefit to
 taxpayers.

4 144 Cong. Rec. 14,735 (1998). Senator Daniel Moynihan (D-NY), ranking member of the
 5 Senate Committee on Finance, also commented that the provision was "certain to cause
 6 confusion and to lead to additional litigation with the IRS[.]" 144 Cong. Rec. 14,693 (1998).

7 In sum, a narrow interpretation of "promotion" is consistent with Congress's intent to
 8 extend the common law attorney-client privilege to tax advisors, subject to a narrow
 9 exception for abusive tax shelters. To interpret the provision otherwise would vitiate
 10 Congress's intent to encourage taxpayers to seek counsel from their non-attorney tax advisors
 11 without fear that those communications would be subject to disclosure.
 12

13 **II. Case Law Supports a Narrow Reading of "Promotion."**

14 A limited number of cases have interpreted the meaning of "promotion" for purposes
 15 of Section 7525(b). On balance, these cases suggest that a narrow reading of "promotion" is
 16 appropriate. In *Countryside*, the Tax Court held that custom tax advice given in an ongoing
 17 relationship is not considered promotion. In *Countryside*, the court valued the fact that the
 18 non-attorney tax advisor had a "long, close relationship with [the client], preparing returns,
 19 assisting with tax planning when asked, answering questions when asked, and responding to
 20 notices and inquiries from Federal and State tax officials." *Countryside*, 132 T.C. at 354. The
 21 court concluded that this relationship was "routine," and that such a relationship was
 22 "precisely the kind of one-on-one tax advice and counseling that is the antithesis of a
 23 'promotional' relationship." *Id.* at 351. In addition to the non-attorney tax advisor's on-going
 24 relationship with the taxpayer, his advice with regard to the transaction in question followed
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1 the same course of procedure as did his prior tax advice, and neither the practitioner nor his
2 accounting firm had a financial stake in the outcome of the transaction beyond the usual
3 client-retention interest. Therefore, the Tax Court held that the accountant was not
4 “promoting” a tax shelter within the meaning of Section 7525(b).

5 The Tax Court in *Countryside* laid out the spectrum of possible interpretations of the
6 scope of the “promotion” limitation to the tax shelter exception. At one end of the spectrum,
7 *United States v. Textron Inc.*, 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 148 (D.R.I. 2007) held that “promotion”
8 meant “the peddling of prepackaged tax shelters,” a very narrow interpretation. At the other
9 end of the spectrum, *Valero* held that “promotion” applied “to a person who organizes or
10 assists in organizing a tax shelter,” a very broad interpretation. *Valero*, 2008 WL 4104368 at
11 *18. The Tax Court, based on its ruling in *Countryside*, instead of adopting an interpretation
12 of “promotion” that adheres to either end of the spectrum, has charted a different course
13 between the two ends of the spectrum. The Tax Court defines the term “promoter” as “an
14 adviser who participated in structuring the transaction or is otherwise related to, has an
15 interest in, or profits from the transaction.” *Rawls*, T.C. Memo. 2012-340 at 12 (citations
16 omitted). The Tax Court explained, however, that:

17 One might need to be careful in applying the definition to some kinds of
18 transactions—a tax lawyer asked by a businessman for advice on how to sell
19 the family business through a tax-favored stock redemption might be said to
20 have “participated in structuring the transaction”—but when the transaction
21 involved is the same tax shelter offered to numerous parties, the definition is
22 workable.

23 *106 Ltd.*, 136 T.C. at 80. Indeed, in cases where the tax advisor “participated in structuring
24 the transaction” but the transaction does not involve a tax shelter offered to numerous parties,
25 a tax advisor is not a “promoter” when he:
26

- has a long-term and continual relationship with his client;
- does not give unsolicited advice regarding the tax shelter;
- advises only within his field of expertise (and not because of his regular involvement in the transaction being scrutinized);
- follows his regular course of conduct in rendering his advice; and
- has no stake in the transaction besides what he bills at his regular hourly rate.

See Id.

Rawls distinguishes between a promoter and a non-attorney tax adviser offering the kind of one-on-one tax advice and counseling that is the antithesis of a “promotional” relationship. In *Rawls*, the taxpayer’s attorneys were found to be promoters, while the taxpayer’s accountant was not. *Rawls* distinguished *106 Ltd.* in finding that the accountant was not a promoter because he: (1) did not introduce, suggest, or coordinate the transaction; (2) advised within his field of expertise; and (3) his compensation did not depend on the outcome of the transactions, and he charged his normal hourly rate. *Rawls*, T.C. Memo. 2012-340 at 34; *see also Textron*, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 148 (“Section 7525(b) is aimed at communications by outside tax practitioners attempting to sell tax shelters to a corporate client”); *Tigers Eye Trading*, T.C. Memo. 2009-121 at 908 (“[A]n advisor who ... has an interest in, or profits from the transaction ... is considered a ‘promoter’ of the transaction.”).¹

The balance of case law supports a narrow interpretation of “promotion” that focuses on the nature of the advisor-client relationship and whether the advisor stands to benefit financially from the transaction at issue. Indeed, in those cases “promotion” was not typical and routine tax planning. Special scrutiny is exercised, however, when a tax adviser has a financial interest in the outcome of the transaction. Attorneys and accountants typically are

¹ Note also that “promotion” should not encompass communications in connection with the implementation of a tax shelter. *See, e.g., Salem Fin., Inc. v. United States*, 102 Fed. Cl. 793, 796 (2012), *aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds*, 786 F.3d 932 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

1 compensated based on an hourly rate, not on the basis of a commission or some other basis
 2 unrelated to the amount of work performed. In some circumstances, flat fee provisions are
 3 used, but these arrangements are not generally linked to whether or not the transaction closes.

4 Providing tax advice when the adviser has a personal financial interest in the
 5 transaction should not be entitled to protection under Section 7525(b). An adviser should be
 6 permitted, however, to advise a client about the consequences of a transaction that qualifies as
 7 a “tax shelter” without having to worry that those communications are disclosable, as long as
 8 the adviser is not “promoting” the shelter. Tax advice that is routinely given by tax advisors
 9 to a client in an ongoing relationship cannot be prohibited “promotion” of a “tax shelter.”
 10 *See, e.g. Countryside*, 132 T.C. at 354; *Rawls*, T.C. Memo. 2012-340 at 32-33. KPMG had an
 11 ongoing relationship with Microsoft and the tax advice provided by KPMG was billed at an
 12 hourly rate. *See* Declaration of Brett A. Weaver, Sept. 12, 2016, ¶¶ 8, 9, 16, 17.

14 **III. The Government’s Interpretation of “Promotion” Does Not Sufficiently Limit the** 15 **Tax Shelter Exception to Ensure that Routine Tax Planning Is Privileged.**

16 The formulation of “promotion” in *Valero* fails to ensure that routine tax advice
 17 offered by non-attorney tax advisors will be protected from disclosure. *Valero* involved the
 18 merger of Valero Energy Corporation with a Canadian oil company. Valero retained Arthur
 19 Andersen, LLP, to provide tax and accounting advice with regard to the merger. The series of
 20 transactions involved in the merger included “the creation of spin-off entities, several same-
 21 day wire transfers of cash, a large distribution from one of the Canadian subsidiaries to a
 22 United-States-based parent, re-classification of a separate foreign subsidiary as a branch of
 23 Valero for tax purposes, and the extinguishment of debt.” *Valero*, 569 F.3d at 628.

1 In *Valero*, the court construed “promotion” to mean “furtherance or encouragement.”
 2 *Id.* at 632. The court noted that nothing in the broad definition of “tax shelter” limits tax
 3 shelters to “cookie-cutter products peddled by shady practitioners or distinguishes tax shelters
 4 from individualized tax advice.” *Id.* In view of this “unambiguous definition,” the court
 5 found that a narrow interpretation of “promotion” would, “through the back door, [result in] a
 6 definition of tax shelters at odds with the text of the statute.” *Id.* The court found this
 7 “contradiction” so powerful that it rendered the statutory text “unambiguous” in its meaning.
 8 The court dismissed the legislative history, holding that it “stands by itself.” *Id.* at 634.

10 Nothing compels either this reading of the statute or an expansion of *Valero*. A
 11 narrower interpretation of “promotion” does not inherently contradict the broad definition of
 12 “tax shelter.” Instead, such a reading harmonizes the statute with Congressional intent and
 13 restores meaning to the Tax Privilege. Multiple courts have reached opposite conclusions
 14 from *Valero*, and the legislative history indicates Congress’s concern that an overbroad
 15 interpretation of Section 7525(b) would undermine the Tax Privilege.²

17 Further, the *Valero* court believed that the “significant purpose” language of Section
 18 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii) ensures that the definition of “tax shelter” is not “boundless,” as “only plans
 19 or arrangements with a significant – as opposed to an ancillary – goal of avoiding or evading
 20 taxes count.” *Id.* at 632. As discussed above, requiring a transaction to have “a significant
 21 purpose” of tax avoidance does not meaningfully limit the definition of “tax shelter,” as
 22 ordinary business transactions that also present “significant” tax savings are arguably within
 23

25 ² Note also that certain national accounting firms may be subject to deferred prosecution agreements that restrict
 26 their ability to engage in certain activities. A finding that routine tax advice is tantamount to the “promotion of
 tax shelters” could jeopardize the status of these deferred prosecution agreements.

1 that scope. Instead, a more plausible reading of the statute would find that “promotion”
2 effectively limits the potentially “boundless” scope of the tax shelter definition.

3 The Government’s attempted expansion of the *Valero* court’s reading of “promotion”
4 results in the exception “swallowing the rule,” contrary to both the intent of Congress and the
5 purpose of the Tax Privilege. If adopted, non-attorney tax advisors would not be able to
6 effectively serve their clients, and clients would be discouraged from seeking the advice of
7 their tax advisors. There is no case from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals touching on the
8 proper interpretation of the term “promotion” as it is used in Section 7525. The Seventh
9 Circuit has used a very broad interpretation in a case not involving a tax shelter offered to
10 numerous parties. The Tax Court’s formulation for interpreting the term “promotion” in cases
11 involving tax shelters offered to numerous parties, but providing guidance for cases that do
12 not involve such tax shelters, has been approved by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
13 *See, e.g., 106 Ltd. v. Comm’r*, 684 F.3d at 90-91.
14
15

16 CONCLUSION

17 Amici respectfully suggest that the Court interpret the term “promotion,” for purposes
18 of Section 7525, consistent with the Tax Court’s approach, which is the better approach
19 because it relies on the legislative history of the statute, adheres to Congress’s intent that the
20 Tax Privilege be coterminous with the attorney-client privilege, and properly focuses the
21 analysis of when a tax advisor is engaged in “promotion” on the appropriate factors.
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DATED this 27th day of October, 2016.

MICHELLE PETERSON LAW, PLLC

By s/Michelle Peterson

Michelle Peterson, WSBA No. 33598

michelle@michellepetersonlaw.com

Michelle Peterson Law, PLLC

1420 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2200

Seattle, WA 98101

(206) 224-7618

*Of Counsel Attorneys*³

Jean A. Pawlow DC # 421782; CA # 139451

Stephen P. Kranz DC # 462627

MN # 023297X; ND # 05048

Kevin Spencer FL # 88722; DC # 489721

MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY LLP

The McDermott Building

500 North Capitol Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 756-8000

Attorneys for Amici Curiae Software

Finance and Tax Executives Council,

National Foreign Trade Council, Financial

Executives International, Information

Technology Industry Council, and National

Association of Manufacturers

³ Pursuant to LCR 83.2(a) and Section III(L) of the Electronic Filing Procedures, the attorneys from the McDermott Will & Emery LLP firm are not currently eligible to appear before this Court and are not entering an appearance at this time.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on October 27, 2016, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to all counsel of record.

Dated this 27th day of October, 2016.

/s/ Michelle Peterson
Michelle Peterson, WSBA No. 33598
*Attorney for Amici Curiae Software Finance
and Tax Executives Council National,
Foreign Trade Council, Financial
Executives International, Information
Technology Industry Council, National
Association of Manufacturers*